The paper proposes necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the natural implementation of (e¢ cient) social choice correspondences (SCC s) in pure …nite exchange economies when some of the agents are partially honest. A partially honest agent is an agent who strictly prefers to tell the truth when lying has no better material consequences for her. Firstly, it is shown that if there is even one partially honest agent in the economy (and the planner does not know her identity), then any SCC is Nash implementable by a natural price-allocation mechanism. Secondly, and in sharp contrast with the results of conventional models of natural implementation, it is shown that the equivalence relationship between natural price-allocation mechanisms and natural price-quantity 2 mechanisms no longer holds. Finally, and even more strikingly, the paper reports that the class of implementable SCC s by natural price-quantity mechanisms is signi…cantly enlarged. JEL classi…cation: C72; D71.
Introduction
Nash implementation aims at reaching allocations that satisfy a pre-speci…ed social welfare criterion in situations in which the mechanism designer does not have all necessary relevant information, but rather needs to elicit it from the agents. To this end, the mechanism designer devises a mechanism, which represents a complete description of the set of actions available to each agent and of the consequences of these actions. When only the Nash equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism coincide with the allocations satisfying the given welfare criterion, this welfare criterion is Nash implementable. The allocations that can be implemented as Nash equilibrium in classical exchange economies are now well understood when it is assumed that the agents are only concerned with their own material gains. 1 This basic tenet is frequently criticized for excluding honesty as a powerful motivator. 2 In fact, simple reasoning and everyday observation suggest that a concern about honesty is an important determinant of behavior. Furthermore, actual behavior is often the outcome of a compromise between what honesty prescribes and what the pursuit of material gains dictates. Experimental evidence con…rms these impressions. As documented in Green et al. (2009) , and Hurkens and Kartik (2009) , experimental subjects adhere to the civic duty of honesty in the absence of opportunistic behavior. In other words, subjects have an intrinsic motivation toward honesty, but the maximization of their material gains acts as a constraint to this motivation.
This …nding is consistent with the conventional views that agents are sel…sh and selfinterested, and that relations are impersonal in market contexts. This consistency is stressed by Jon Elster who states "Cutthroat competitiveness in the market can go together with strict adherence to norms of honesty" (Elster, 1989; p. 102 ). Yet, barring the few exceptions discussed below, the implementation literature has neglected the role of honesty as a motivator of human behavior and has failed to appreciate its in ‡uence on the design of market-like mechanisms.
This paper follows Elster's perspective and studies the question of which welfare criterion can be implemented in pure …nite exchange economies when their participants uphold an intrinsic motivation toward honesty. This study is conducted by focusing on natural mechanisms (Saijo et al., 1996a; 1999) . This paper demonstrates that even a 'minimal'propensity toward honesty of the participants enlarges considerably the class of implementable welfare criteria.
This paper assumes complete information among the agents, and that all participants in the economy are Nash competitors. Furthermore, it assumes that in the economy there are partially honest agents. A partially honest participant is an agent who strictly prefers to be truthful in her reports when a lie does not better serve her material interests, given the actions of the other agents. Brie ‡y, the agent at issue can be viewed as having lexicographic preferences for action pro…les in which she is concerned …rst, with material gains, and second, with truthful behavior. The paper also assumes that the mechanism designer knows that there are partially honest agents in the economy but does not know their identities or their exact number.
The role of honesty is quanti…ed by devising only natural mechanisms. 3 These mecha- 1 Henceforth, by implementation we mean Nash implementation. The seminal paper is Maskin (1999) . For recent surveys see, for instance, Jackson (2001) and Maskin and Sjöström (2002) . 2 For instructive discussions on the role of emotions and norms in economics, see Bowles and Gintis (2000) , Camerer (2003) , Elster (1998) , Kreps (1997) , Sen (1997) , and Suzumura and Xu (2001) . 3 Simple mechanisms introduced by Thomson (2005) are very similar in spirit to natural mechanisms, nisms have straightforward economic interpretations because agents'actions consist of announcing consumption bundles and prices. Moreover, these mechanisms have several other economically meaningful properties. In fact, following Saijo et al. (1996a; 1999) , the paper demands the mechanism (i) to be of …nite dimension, (ii) to be individually feasible and balanced, (iii) to satisfy the regularity condition of forthrightness, and (iv) to satisfy the best response property. 4 An individually feasible and balanced mechanism implies that, in and out of equilibrium, each agent always receives a consumption bundle that lies in her consumption set, and the aggregate consumption is equal to the aggregate social endowments of commodities. The forthrightness property requires that, in equilibrium, each agent obtains what she has reported as her consumption bundle. Finally, the best response property requires each participant to have a best response action for any given actions by the other agents. 5 Within the class of natural mechanisms, the paper considers four types of mechanisms in which each agent's action consists of reporting (1) a price vector and a consumption bundle, (2) a price vector and two consumption bundles, (3) a price vector and n 1 consumption bundles, 6 and (4) a price vector and an allocation (an entire pro…le of bundles). These four types of natural mechanisms are termed, respectively, price-quantity, price-quantity 2 , price-quantity n 1 , and price-allocation mechanisms. The paper limits its analysis to …nite pure exchange economies, and identi…es the class of e¢ cient welfare criteria -summarized in social choice correspondences (SCC s) -that are implementable by each type of mechanism.
Before discussing the implications and novelty of our …ndings, it may be worthwhile to emphasize that the departure from the standard implementation set-up is very limited. Like the standard framework, the mechanism designer's implementation problem consists of designing a natural mechanism in such a way that, regardless of what the characteristics of the current economy are and who the partially honest agents involved in the allocation process are, only the SCC -optimal allocations emerge as the equilibrium outcomes from the devised mechanism. Moreover, a truly minimal degree of honesty is injected into implementation problems. This is formulated by explicating what constitutes a truthful report in this study. Because a common feature of the four types of natural mechanisms is that an agent's action is made up of two announcement components -one representing prices, and the other representing consumption bundles -this paper assumes that an agent is honest when only the consumption bundles component reported by this agent is consistent with the pre-speci…ed welfare criterion for the underlying economy.
The main results of the paper can be summarized as follows. In the case of natural pricequantity mechanisms, the presence of partially honest agents enlarges in a signi…cant way the class of implementable SCC s with respect to the class that is implementable in the conventional framework. In contrast to the …ndings of Saijo et al. (1999) , this paper reports not only that the constrained Walrasian correspondence is implementable, but also that the (unthough di¤erent in substance. Because our objective is to investigate how the implementability is a¤ected when there are partially-honest agents, rather than studying the implementability of speci…c welfare criteria, the paper focuses on natural mechanisms. 4 The pioneers of the approach of setting several desirable properties for a mechanism are Dutta et al. (1995) and Sjöström (1996) . See Saijo et al. (1996a; 1999) for a detailed discussion on the implications of the properties listed above. For an instructive study of informational properties of resource-allocation mechanisms, see Hurwicz (1986b) . 5 See Saijo et al. (1996a; 1999) , along with the references cited therein, for a detailed discussion on the implications of these properties. 6 n 2 is the number of competing agents in our exchange economies.
constrained) Walrasian correspondence is implementable in two-commodity economies. The latter …nding is even more striking than the former because the Walrasian correspondence is not implementable in the conventional framework. While the class of implementable SCC s is further enlarged when natural price-quantity 2 mechanisms are applied, this paper shows a more surprising …nding that any e¢ cient SCC is implementable when natural price-quantity n 1 mechanisms are applied. This result runs counter to conventional results, which dictate that only monotonic SCC s are implementable. Moreover, while the analysis reveals that implementation by natural price-quantity n 1 mechanisms is equivalent to implementation by natural price-allocation mechanisms, the equivalence relationship between implementation by natural price-quantity 2 mechanisms and implementation by natural price-allocation mechanisms no longer holds. For instance, the e¢ cient and egalitarian-equivalent correspondence is implementable by a natural price-allocation mechanism, but it is not implementable by any natural price-quantity 2 mechanism. 7
Literature review
As a …nal entry to this section, we present the study and its …ndings within the growing literature on implementation with partially honest agents. 8 The papers most closely related to this study are those by Dutta and Sen (2012) and Lombardi and Yoshihara (2011a). 9 Dutta and Sen partially quanti…ed the e¤ect of honesty in abstract social choice environments. We borrow from that paper the concept of partial honesty. Dutta and Sen's main …nding is that, when there are three or more agents, any SCC satisfying the condition of no-veto power is implementable. To get this result, the authors focussed on Maskin-type mechanisms, which should be contrasted with the types of natural mechanisms studied in this paper. For instance, in Maskin-type mechanisms each agent's announcement includes either whole preference pro…les or whole indi¤erence sets for several agents. In the economic applications on which we focus, these are in…nite-dimensional.
Drawing primarily from the above seminal work on the subject, Lombardi and Yoshihara addressed the issue of information decentralization and e¢ ciency in mechanisms. As informationally decentralized mechanisms, the authors take Saijo-type mechanisms (Saijo, 1988; Lombardi and Yoshihara, 2011b) , where each agent must announce her own type and that of her neighbor, an alternative, and an integer (henceforth, s-mechanisms). One main …nding is that, in contrast to the case of Maskin-type mechanisms, a weaker variant of Maskin monotonicity is necessary to fully identify the class of implementable SCC s by s-mechanisms. Consequently, several e¢ cient SCC s, such as the e¢ cient and egalitarianequivalent correspondence and the Walrasian correspondence, are not implementable via this type of mechanism. It is intriguing, however, that those SCC s are implementable when more demanding mechanisms such as natural price-allocation mechanisms are applied. Note that natural price-allocation mechanisms are much more informationally e¢ cient than s-mechanisms both in quantitative as well as qualitative senses. First, quantitatively speaking, the strategy space of each participant in natural price-allocation mechanisms is much 'smaller'than that in s-mechanisms, in the sense that the former is …nite-dimensional whereas the latter is in…nite-dimensional. Second, qualitatively speaking, all components of each message in price-allocation mechanisms consist solely of self-relevant information, while they do not in s-mechanisms. 10 This noticeable di¤erence makes our result of natural price-allocation mechanisms more compelling.
Other related papers are by Corchón and Herrero (2004) and Matsushima (2008) . Matsushima is the …rst author who quanti…ed the role of honesty in implementation theory. Matsushima shows that if a social choice function is Bayesian-incentive compatible and agents have the standard, quasi-linear preferences over outcomes and su¤er a small utility loss from lying, then this social choice function is implementable in iteratively undominated strategies. Therefore, it is also implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium when there are more than two participants. Clearly, the main body of this paper is substantially di¤erent from Matsushima (2008). First, in contrast to Matsushima (2008), this paper does not need to presume that all agents should have intrinsic preferences for honesty but needs only to presume that at least one agent has such preferences. Second, this paper focuses on implementation problems with complete information, while Matsushima (2008) concentrated on problems with incomplete information.
Corchón and Herrero introduce decency requirements for the set of admissible messages that depend on the true preferences of the outcomes of agents, and investigate their e¤ects on the class of implementable SCC s. Given a particular formulation of these requirements, these authors show that a stronger variant of no-veto power is su¢ cient for implementation in decent strategies. In contrast, imposing no condition on the set of messages conveyed by an agent, this paper instead assumes that each agent has a complete preference order of message pro…les, which is determined as much by her intrinsic taste for the bundle brought about by each pro…le as by her sense of honesty.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes a formal model. Section 3 reports the analysis for price-quantity n 1 and price-allocation mechanisms. Sections 4 and 5 cover price-quantity 2 and price-quantity mechanisms, respectively. Section 6 discusses brie ‡y the implications of the results reported in sections 4 and 5. Section 7 reports the analysis for two-agent economies. Section 8 concludes brie ‡y. Long proofs are collected in the Appendix.
The Model
There are n 2 agents or participants in N f1; :::; ng and` 2 distinct commodities in L f1; :::;`g. Unless otherwise speci…ed, we assume that the cardinality of L is` 2. R is the set of all real numbers; R + (resp., R ++ ) denotes the set of all non-negative (respectively, positive) real numbers; R`is the Cartesian product of ordered`-tuples of real numbers, whereas R`+ (resp., R`+ + ) denotes its non-negative (resp., positive) orthant. Vector inequalities are de…ned as follows: for all x; y 2 R`, x y if x` y`for each`2 L, x > y if x y and x 6 = y, and x y if x`> y`for each`2 L. Each agent i 2 N is characterized by a consumption space R`+ (where x i = (x i1 ; :::; x i`) 2 R`+ is the agent i's commodity bundle), by an endowment vector ! i 2 R`+, and by a preference relation de…ned over R`+. We assume that agent i's preferences have a utility representation u i : R`+ ! R which is continuous and quasi-concave on R`+, and either strictly monotonic on R`+ or strictly monotonic on R`+ + where the utility of every interior consumption bundle is strictly higher than the utility of any consumption bundle on the boundary. U is the class of all such utility functions, whereas U i is the class of admissible utility functions for agent i 2 N . Given a pro…le of endowment vectors, we denote P i2N ! i 2 R`+ + as the aggregate endowment. It is assumed that the distribution of endowments is known and …xed.
An allocation is a list of bundles x = (x 1 ; :::; x n ) 2 R n+ , whereas a feasible allocation is an allocation x = (x 1 ; :::;
The set of all feasible allocations is denoted by A. For any allocation x 2 R n+ and any (non-empty) set of agents ? 6 = T N , x T (x i ) i2N nT is the list of bundles for the agents in N nT . 11 Given x T 2 R t+ and x T 2 R (n t)+ , we denote (x T ; x T ) as the allocation consisting of these x T and x T . Given a set S R n + , its boundary and interior are denoted @S and S, respectively.
A social choice correspondence (SCC ) is a multi-valued mapping F : U N A such that for each u 2 U N , F (u) is a non-empty subset of feasible allocations, that is, ? 6 = F (u) A. Unless speci…ed otherwise, we do not assume that for all u 2 U N and all x 2 F (u), x i 0 for all i 2 N . The set of (Pareto) e¢ cient allocations for the economy u 2 U N , denoted
For any (u i ; x i ) 2 U i R`+, V i (x i ; u i ) fy i 2 R`+jy i and u i (x i ) u i (y i )g denotes the weak upper contour set for agent i with u i at x i . Given (u i ; x i ) 2 U i R`+, a price vector p belonging to the unit simplex , that is, p 2 , is said to be a sub-gradient of u i at
is non-empty. In words, (x; u) consists of prices p each of which is normal to a hyperplane separating the weak upper contour sets of all agents with u at x. Any p 2 (x; u) is referred to as a Pareto e¢ cient price for u at x. If u i 2 U i is di¤erentiable for all i 2 N and F 2 F selects only interior allocations, ? 6 = F (u) A \ R n+ + for any u 2 U N , then the set (x; u) is a singleton whenever x 2 F (u); in particular, the set (x; u) has the form of fpg such that Du i (x i ) = p for all i 2 N . 12 11 The weak set inclusion is denoted by , while the strict set inclusion is denoted by . The notation "t" means the cardinality of the set T . 12 For u i 2 U i , Du i (x i ) denoted the gradient vector at x i which is normalized to belong to the unit simplex .
A mechanism is a pair (M; g), where M M 1 ::: M n , with each M i being a (nonempty) set, and g : M ! R n`. It consists of a message space M , where M i is the message space for agent i 2 N , and an outcome function g such that g (m) = (g i (m)) i2N 2 R n`f or each m 2 M . m i 2 M i denotes a generic message (or strategy) for agent i. A message pro…le is denoted by m (m 1 ; :::; m n ) 2 M . For any m 2 M and j 2 N , let m j (m 1 ; :::; m j 1 ; m j+1 ; :::; m n ) 2 i2N nfjg M i M j . Given an m j 2 M j and an m j 2 M j , we denote (m j ; m j ) to be the message pro…le consisting of m j and m j . g (M i ; m i ) is the attainable set of agent i at m i , that is, the set of bundles that agent i can induce when the other agents select m i . A mechanism is:
for each m 2 M . An individually feasible and balanced mechanism has the property that g (m) 2 A for each m 2 M . A mechanism satis…es the best response property if, for all (i;
for all m 0 i 2 M i . A mechanism induces a class of (non-cooperative) games f( ; u) ju 2 U N g. Given a game ( ; u), we say that m 2 M is a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium at u if and only if, for all i 2 N , g M i ; m i L (g i (m ) ; u i ). For any game ( ; u), N E ( ; u) denotes the set of Nash equilibrium message pro…les of ( ; u), whereas N A ( ; u) represents the corresponding set of Nash equilibrium allocations. A mechanism implements F 2 F in Nash equilibria, or simply implements F , if and only if F (u) = N A ( ; u) for all u 2 U N . If such a mechanism exists, then F is (Nash) implementable.
For any mechanism and any agent i 2 N , a truth-telling correspondence is a correspondence
An interpretation of the set T i (u; F ) is that, given the mechanism and a pair (u; F ) 2 U N F, agent i behaves truthfully at the message pro…le m 2 M if and only if m i 2 T i (u; F ). In other words, T i (u; F ) is the set of truthful messages of agent i under the mechanism , when the current economy is u 2 U N and the social goal is given by F . Note that the type of elements of M i constituting T i (u; F ) depends on the type of mechanism that one may consider. For example, if the message conveyed by each agent to the mechanism designer involves the announcement of an allocation and the relevant notion of truthfulness consists of sending an allocation consistent with the welfare criterion F 2 F for any economy u 2 U N , then M i may be de…ned by
For any (i; u) 2 N U , let < u i be agent i's weak order over M under the economy u. The asymmetric factor of < u i is denoted by u i , while the symmetric part is denoted by s u i . For any u 2 U N , < u is the pro…le of weak orders over M under the economy u; in other words, < u (< u i ) i2N . As in Dutta and Sen (2011) , partially honest behavior is de…ned as follows. Definition 1. An agent h 2 N is a partially honest agent if for any mechanism , any u 2 U N , any F 2 F, any m (m h ; m h ), and any m 0 (m 0 h ; m h ) 2 M , the following properties hold:
). An agent i 2 N who is also a partially honest agent is denoted by h. If agent i 2 N is not a partially honest agent (that is, i 6 = h), then for each game ( ; u) and all m; m 0 2 M : (m; m 0 ) 2< u i if and only if u i (g i (m)) u i (g i (m 0 )). Unless otherwise speci…ed, the following informational assumption holds throughout the paper. Assumption 1. There are partially honest agents in N . The mechanism designer is well aware of the fact that there are partially honest agents in N but she does not know their identities or their exact number.
Thus, while the mechanism designer knows that there are partially honest agents in the society and how these agents behave, the mechanism designer knows neither the identity of the partially honest agents nor their exact number.
Let ? 6 = H 2 N n? be a class of non-empty subsets of N . The family H is viewed as the class of conceivable sets of partially honest agents. That is, if H 2 H, then this H is a conceivable set of partially honest agents. By Assumption 1, the mechanism designer knows that H is non-empty, and she may even know the composition of H, but she never knows what element of H is the current set of partially honest agents in society. Assumption 1 implies that #H 2.
A mechanism induces a class of (non-cooperative) games with partially honest agents f( ; < u ) j (u; H) 2 U N Hg. Given a game ( ; < u ), we say that m 2 M is a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium with partially honest agents at u if and only if, for all i 2 N , m ; m i ; m i 2< u i for all m i 2 M i . Given a game ( ; < u ), N E ( ; < u ) denotes the set of Nash equilibrium message pro…les of ( ; < u ), whereas N A ( ; < u ) represents the corresponding set of Nash equilibrium allocations. Definition 2. A mechanism partially honestly implements F 2 F in Nash equilibria, or simply partially honestly implements F , if and only if F (u) = N A ( ; < u ) for all u 2 U N and all H 2 H.
If such a mechanism exists, then F is partially honest (Nash) implementable.
Note that this de…nition of implementation is similar, but not identical, to the standard de…nition. 13 First, the Nash equilibrium allocations are given by the game ( ; < u ) rather than by the game ( ; u). Second, the equivalence of the set of SCC -optimal allocations with the set of Nash equilibrium allocations is required not only for any economy u 2 U N , but also for any conceivable set of partially honest agents H 2 H. The latter part of the de…nition presented above captures the distinctiveness of our implementation models. Indeed, in these models, a preference over message pro…les for each participant does not necessarily coincide with her preference over allocations, and the mechanism designer has no information of these preferences. 14 
Price-quantity n 1 and price-allocation mechanisms
This section explores the natural implementation of SCC s via natural price-allocation mechanisms and price-quantity n 1 mechanisms.
While in a price-allocation mechanism each participant states a price vector and an allocation, a price-quantity n 1 mechanism is a game form in which each agent reports to the mechanism designer a price vector, her consumption bundle, and the consumption bundles of the other n 2 participants. A way to proceed is to arrange agents clockwise facing inward, and require that each participant i announces, inter alia, her consumption bundle and the consumption bundles of the n 2 participants standing to her left. 15 Requiring forthrightness, individual feasibility, balancedness, and the best response property, partially honest implementation by natural price-allocation mechanisms and by natural price-quantity n 1 mechanisms can be de…ned as follows.
Definition 3. An SCC F 2 F is partially honest implementable by a natural priceallocation mechanism if there exists a mechanism such that: (i) partially honestly implements F ; (ii) for each i 2 N , M i = A; (iii) for each u 2 U N , each x 2 F (u), and each p 2 (x; u), if m i = (p; x) for each i 2 N , then m 2 N E ( ; < u ) and g (m) = x; (iv) is individually feasible and balanced;
(v) satis…es the best response property.
Definition 4. An SCC F 2 F is partially honest implementable by a natural pricequantity n 1 mechanism if there exists a mechanism such that: (i) partially honestly implements F ;
(iv) is individually feasible and balanced;
Condition (iii) of both De…nition 3 and De…nition 4 is the regularity condition of forthrightness. 16 We are now ready to de…ne the notion of truthfulness employed in this section for the partially honest participants involved in each of the natural mechanisms just de…ned. By employing the idea of Dutta and Sen (2012) and Lombardi and Yoshihara (2011a), an agent's message is truthful if it is truthful in its consumption bundles component. Formally, for any economy u 2 U N , any welfare criterion F 2 F, and any agent i 2 N , the set of truthful messages for a natural price-allocation mechanism is
whereas for a natural price-quantity n 1 mechanism , it is
A key property of the notion of truthful messages is that it is functionally independent of prices announced by the participants. In this sense, our characterization results are provided by injecting only a slight preference for honesty into the natural implementation theory. Nonetheless, the conclusion that can be drawn from the following theorem (whose proof is relegated to the Appendix) is that even this small departure from the conventional framework widens the scope of implementation by natural price-quantity n 1 mechanisms dramatically.
Theorem 1. Let n 3 and suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, every SCC F 2 F is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity n 1 mechanism. Saijo et al. (1999) show that the constrained Walrasian correspondence cannot be implemented by any natural mechanism if the common marginal rate of substitution is not uniquely determined and there are more than two commodities, that is,` 3. A remarkable implication of Theorem 1 is that the (unconstrained) Walrasian correspondence is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity n 1 mechanism, even though the common marginal rate of substitution is not unique and the equilibrium allocations are not necessarily interior allocations.
It is important to note that for an individually feasible and balanced mechanism, announcing a price vector and n 1 consumption bundles is equivalent to announcing a price vector and an allocation. This is because any n 1 consumption bundles (x i ; :::; x i+n 2 ) 2 Q n 1 induce a unique allocation (x i ; :::;
The following result states an obvious implication of this equivalence relationship in the light of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. Let n 3 and suppose that Assumption 1 holds. An SCC F 2 F is partially honest implementable by a natural price-allocation if and only if F is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity n 1 mechanism.
As a consequence of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, every e¢ cient SCC is partially honest implementable by a natural price-allocation mechanism.
In classical economic environments, while any e¢ cient SCC is partially honest implementable when no restriction is imposed on the class of available mechanisms, Lombardi and Yoshihara (2011a) showed that several e¢ cient SCC s, such as the e¢ cient and egalitarianequivalent correspondence and the Walrasian correspondence, are not partially honest implementable when only s-mechanisms can be employed. Compared to this result, Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 give us considerably more interesting results, because as mentioned in the introduction, a natural price-allocation mechanism incorporates a strategy space reduction which is more signi…cant than that of an s-mechanism, regarding the price announcement as part of the self-relevant information.
Before closing this section, it may be worth noting that in the light of Theorem 1 and the equivalence relationship between natural price-allocation mechanisms and natural price quantity n 1 mechanisms, all e¢ cient SCC s are partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity 2 mechanism in three-agent economies.
Corollary 2. Let n = 3 and suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Every SCC F 2 F is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity 2 mechanism.
Price-quantity 2 mechanisms
As shown in Corollary 2, any e¢ cient SCC is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity 2 mechanism in three-agent economies. In other words, the equivalence be-tween partially honest implementation by natural price-quantity 2 mechanisms and partially honest implementation by natural price-allocation mechanisms holds in economies with only three agents, as in the case of the standard framework of natural implementation (see Saijo et al., 1996a; 1999) . It is not apparent, however, whether such an equivalence holds when there are four agents or more. This section investigates whether this equivalence relationship continues to hold when there are more than three participants.
To this end, additional notation is needed. For each given u 2 U N and x 2 F (u), let
whereas the sets F 1 ! (x; p) and F (x; u) are de…ned respectively as follows:
Then, for each u 2 U N and each x 2 F (u), let us de…ne the set F (x; u) as follows:
Finally, for each u 2 U N , each x 2 F (u), and each p 2
Requiring forthrightness, individual feasibility, balancedness, and the best response property, we de…ne partially honest implementation by a natural price-quantity 2 mechanism as follows.
Definition 5. An SCC F 2 F is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity 2 mechanism if there exists a mechanism such that: (i) partially honestly implements F ;
Condition (iii) in De…nition 5 represents the regularity condition of forthrightness by natural price-quantity 2 mechanisms and di¤ers slightly from that imposed by Saijo et al. (1999; De…nition 3(iii) ). The di¤erence between the two conditions is that Saijo et al. (1999)'s condition refers to all e¢ cient prices, p, supporting the allocation x at u, that is, to any p 2 (x; u), while our condition only refers to those e¢ cient prices belonging to the set F (x; u). So, the di¤erence materializes only when F (x; u) is a proper subset of (x; u). In this sense, our forthrightness condition is slightly weaker than the regularity condition provided by Saijo et al. (1999) , when it is applied to the standard framework of natural implementation.
In line with the previous section, this section assumes that an agent involved in a pricequantity 2 mechanism is truthful when only the consumption bundles component reported by this agent is consistent with the pre-speci…ed welfare criterion for the underlying economy. Formally, for any economy u 2 U N , any societal goal F 2 F, and any agent i 2 N , the set of truthful messages for a natural price-quantity 2 mechanism, , is given by
(3) Let us now turn to state a condition relevant to partially honest implementation by natural price-quantity 2 mechanisms. To this end, let us …rst de…ne a new necessary and suf-…cient condition for implementation by natural price-quantity 2 mechanisms in the standard framework.
Note that this condition is slightly weaker than the condition GM introduced by Saijo et al. (1999; p. 278 ). This results from restricting the application of condition GM to only e¢ cient prices belonging to the set F (x; u). Since our forthrightness condition is weaker than that presented in Saijo et al. (1999) for natural price-quantity 2 mechanisms, condition GM is a plausible weakening of condition GM . Con…rmation of this assertion can be made by applying the class of natural mechanisms presented in De…nition 5 to the conventional framework. Within this framework, it can be shown that any e¢ cient SCC F is implementable by a natural price-quantity 2 mechanism -which encompasses the forthrightness condition of De…nition 5 above -if and only if F satis…es our variant of condition GM , that is, condition GM . A remarkable implication of this characterization is that the constrained Walrasian correspondence becomes implementable by a natural price-quantity 2 mechanism (Refer to Section 6 for details). This result runs counter to the …ndings of Saijo et al. (1999) , according to which this SCC is not implementable by any natural mechanism, unless the extra condition of budget balance is posited. 17 As discussed in Section 2, in our set-up, to be ensured of the implementability of F , the mechanism designer has to design a mechanism in such a way that, no matter what the current economy is and no matter who the partially honest participants are, only the F -optimal allocations are realized as the equilibrium outcomes of the devised game form. In particular, for any given economy, the designed mechanism must also implement the targeted welfare criterion F under all conceivable sets of partially honest agents. Correspondingly, a requirement for the partially honest implementability of F must also be applied to any conceivable set H 2 H of partially honest participants. Having mentioned this point, let us introduce the following weaker variant of condition GM for characterizing partially honest implementation by natural price-quantity 2 mechanisms.
The following theorem (whose proof is relegated to the Appendix) shows that condition d GM is necessary and su¢ cient for partially honest implementation by natural pricequantity 2 mechanisms. Theorem 2. Let n 3 and Assumption 1 hold. An SCC F 2 F is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity 2 mechanism if and only if it satis…es condition d GM .
The above theorem, when combined with Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, shows that, when there are four or more participants, the class of SCC s that are partially honest implementable by natural price-quantity 2 mechanisms is not equivalent to the class of SCC s that are partially honest implementable by natural price-allocation mechanisms (Refer to Section 6 for a more detailed discussion). This result stands in stark contrast to the equivalence result between implementation by natural price-allocation mechanisms and implementation by natural price-quantity 2 mechanisms obtained by Saijo et al. (1996a; 1999) .
Price-quantity mechanisms
From the viewpoint of decentralization, a price-quantity mechanism is qualitatively di¤erent from a price-quantity 2 mechanism. Though a price-quantity 2 mechanism is more e¢ cient than a price-allocation mechanism, it is still far from the self-relevancy condition advocated by Hurwicz (1960) . According to this condition, each agent must reveal information related only to her own characteristics. In this sense, no price-quantity 2 mechanism is decentralized because each participant is required to disclose information about another participant. In contrast, if we consider Pareto e¢ ciency to be one of our minimum requirements and regard the price announcement component of the message as part of the self-relevant information, then a natural price-quantity mechanism is a self-relevant and natural mechanism. This section, then, investigates partially honest implementability of e¢ cient SCC s by natural price-quantity mechanisms.
The de…nition of partially honest implementation by price-quantity mechanisms used in this section can be stated as follows. Definition 6. An SCC F 2 F is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity mechanism if there exists a mechanism = (M; g) such that: (i) partially honestly implements F ;
(v) satis…es the best response property. De…nition 6 stipulates individual feasibility, balancedness, and the best response property in a natural price-quantity mechanism. Moreover, Condition (iii) in De…nition 6 represents the regularity condition of forthrightness in a natural price-quantity mechanism. It is important to note that this condition di¤ers slightly from that postulated by In line with the previous sections, we assume that a participant of a natural price-quantity mechanism is truthful when the consumption bundle reported by this agent coincides with a bundle that the SCC dictates for her, given the underlying economy. Formally, for any economy u 2 U N , any societal goal F 2 F, and any agent i 2 N , the set of truthful messages for a natural price-quantity mechanism is given by
A …rst condition relevant to partially honest implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms is stated below.
Weak Condition GM (GM ). For any given
For the reasons illustrated in the previous section, condition GM is de…ned for any admissible set of partially honest agents H 2 H. It is important to note that condition GM implies condition d
GM . Note that, as in the case of Saijo et al. (1996a; 1999) , we cannot but impose another condition for implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms, which should de…ne a punishment scheme for potential deviators. Let (p; x) 2 A be given. De…ne the set F 1 (x; p) as follows:
o denote the set of potential deviators for price-quantity implementation. The following condition is a slightly weaker variant of the condition GP Q introduced by Saijo et al. (1999; p. 279) .
The only di¤erence between condition GP Q and GP Q lies in the de…nition of the set of potential deviators, I F (p; x). While condition GP Q de…nes it by referring to F 1 , the above condition de…nes the set I F (p; x) by referring to F 1 . Moreover, it can be shown that condition GP Q , when combined with condition GM , fully identi…es the class of SCC s that are implementable by natural price-quantity mechanisms in the standard set-up. A remarkable consequence of this characterization is that the constrained Walrasian correspondence is implementable by a natural price-quantity mechanism presented in De…nition 6 (Refer to Section 6 for details), while its implementability is impossible under the de…nition of natural price-quantity mechanism provided by Saijo et al. (1999; De…nition 2).
Next, let us introduce a variant of GP Q to characterize partially honest implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms. Again, note that the requirement of the axiom should be applied to any given potential set H 2 H of partially honest agents.
Weak Condition GPQ (GP Q ). For any given H 2 H, and any (p; x) 2 Q n such that I F (p; x) = N and x = 2 A, there exists z (p; x) 2 A such that: simple punishment condition, we omit it here for the sake of brevity. 18 The following theorem (whose proof is relegated to the Appendix) shows that condition GM and condition GP Q fully identify the class of SCC s that are partially honest implementable by natural price-quantity mechanisms.
Theorem 3. Let n 3 and suppose that Assumption 1 holds. An SCC F 2 F is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity mechanism if and only if it satis…es condition GM and condition GP Q .
If balancedness is replaced by the less demanding postulate of the weak balancedness, in the sense that the mechanism is required to be only weakly balanced, then condition GP Q can be dispensed with from Theorem 3, as the following corollary shows.
Corollary 3. Let n 3 and suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Let F 2 F. If free disposal is allowed, then F is partially honest implementable by a price-quantity mechanism satisfying forthrightness, individual feasibility, weak balancedness and the best response property if and only if it satis…es condition GM .
Implications
In this section, we discuss brie ‡y some implications of the …ndings of the previous sections.
Before going into detail, let us specify the structure on which the analysis is based. Firstly, the informational assumption on which our theorems are based is that the mechanism designer knows that there are partially honest participants and how these agents behave. Then, the mechanism designer does not know the identity of these agents or their exact number. Due to this truly limited information, the mechanism designer, to be ensured of the implementability of her goal F 2 F, has to design a mechanism in such a way that, regardless of the current economy and the partially honest participants involved in the mechanism, only 18 The the F -optimal outcomes emerge as the equilibrium outcomes of the devised game form. This implies that the mechanism designer has to devise a mechanism that guarantees the partially honest implementability of F even when H = 2 N n?. Indeed, by covering this case, the mechanism designer is ensured of the implementability of F for any other specialization that the set H may take. For this reason, in what follows, we turn to analyze some implications of the above theorems under the speci…cation that H = 2 N n?. Secondly, the welfare criteria F considered below are de…ned on the domain U of all pro…les of utility functions which are continuous, quasi-concave, and strictly monotonic. Finally, the analysis is limited to the following well-known welfare criteria.
Individual rational and e¢ cient correspondence IrP :
Egalitarian-equivalent and e¢ cient correspondence EE: EE (u) fx 2 A j there is a unique maximal number 2 (0; 1) :
No-envy and e¢ cient correspondence N P : N P (u)
Constrained Walrasian correspondence W c : W c (u) fx 2 A j there is p 2 : p x i = p ! i for all i 2 N , and for any y i 2 R`+ with y i and p y i p ! i :
The …rst result is an impossibility one, since it shows that condition d GM imposes nontrivial restrictions on the class of partially honest implementable SCC s by natural pricequantity 2 mechanisms. Corollary 4. Let n 4 and suppose that Assumption 1 holds with H = 2 N n?. Then, the egalitarian-equivalent and e¢ cient correspondence, EE, de…ned on U N = U , is not partially honest implementable by any natural price-quantity 2 mechanism.
Proof. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds with H = 2 N n?. Moreover, let n 4. By Theorem 2, it su¢ ces to show that EE, de…ned on U N = U , does not satisfy condition d GM . To this end, take any u 2 U N , where each u i is strictly concave and di¤erentiable, and any x 2 EE (u) \ R n+ + . Then, there exists a unique supporting price fpg = EE (x; u), for which each EE i (x; p) is constructed. By de…nition, for each u 0 2 EE 1 (x; p), there exists u 0 2 (0; 1) such that, for each i 2 N ,
Take an economy u 2 U N , where u i is strictly concave and di¤erentiable for each agent i 2 N , such that EE i (x; p) L (x i ; u i ) for all i 2 N . Moreover, suppose that there are two distinct agents j; k 2 N such that, for some > 0, u j (x j + ( ; 0)) = u j ( ) and u k (x k ( ; 0)) = u k ( ) for some > (x;p) , and Du j (x j + ( ; 0)) = p = Du k (x k ( ; 0)), where 0 is the` 1-th dimensional zero vector. Finally, for any other agent l 2 N n fj; kg, let u l (x l ) = u l ( ). By construction, there exist j ; k such that (x;p) < j < < k , u j (x j ) = u j j , and u k (x k ) = u k k . Note that such a pro…le u exists because of our supposition that U N = U . Thus, x 2 P (u ) nEE (u ), but x x j + ( ; 0) ; x k ( ; 0) ; x fj;kg 2 EE (u ). Note that, since EE is essentially single-valued, 19 and each u i is strictly concave, fx g = EE (u ) holds.
Consider a permutation such that (k) = (j) + 1, (j + 1) = k, and (l) = l for any l 2 N n fj
and x x (l) l2N . Then, since EE meets the anonymity property,
, and
x (l) = x (l) for any other (l) 2 N n f (j) ; (k)g. Moreover, since H = 2 N n? and n 4, there exists H 2 H such that f (j) ; (j) 1; (k)g \ H = ?. Thus, for any h 2 H, x h = x h and x h+1 = x h+1 hold, which implies that EE does not satisfy condition d GM , as sought.
Note that this corollary, combined with Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, implies that, when there are four or more participants, the class of SCC s that are partially honest implementable by natural price-allocation mechanisms di¤ers from the class of SCC s that are partially honest implementable by natural price-quantity 2 mechanisms. This result runs counter to the equivalence relationship holding between these two classes in the conventional natural implementation framework.
While it is easy to see that the individual rational and e¢ cient correspondence, IrP , and the no-envy and e¢ cient correspondence, N P , satisfy condition d GM , it is not apparent that the constrained Walrasian correspondence, W c , is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity 2 mechanism. This is due to the fact that Saijo et al. (1999; Lemma 3) show that W c is not implementable by any natural mechanism in economies endowed with more than two commodities. In contrast to this impossibility result, the following lemma shows that this SCC can be implemented by a natural price-quantity 2 mechanism under the concept of natural implementation presented in De…nition 5. Lemma 1. Let n 3. Then, the constrained Walrasian correspondence, W c , de…ned on U N = U , satis…es condition GM .
Proof. Let n 3. Assume that W c is de…ned on U N = U , and take any u 2 U N and any x 2 W c (u). Let us …rst show that Wc (x; u) is non-empty and consists solely of the constrained Walrasian competitive equilibrium price vectors. Then, let p Wc 2 (x; u) be a constrained Walrasian price vector. Note that since x 2 W c (u), there is such a price vector. Then, by de…nition, p Wc x i = p Wc ! i for any i 2 N . Since U N = U , there always exists u 0 2 U N such that p Wc = (x; u 0 ). Then, by the de…nition of W c , x 2 W c (u 0 ), which, in turn, implies that W 1 c! x; p Wc 6 = ?. Therefore, p Wc 2 Wc (x; u), as sought. Next, let p 2 (x; u) be not a constrained Walrasian price vector. Then, by de…nition, p x i 6 = p ! i for some i 2 N . Since U N = U , there always exists u 0 2 U N such that fpg = (x; u 0 ). This implies that x 2 P (u 0 ). Then, since p x i 6 = p ! i holds for some i 2 N , x = 2 W c (u 0 ). The same argument is applied for any other u 00 2 U N such that fpg = (x; u 00 ). Thus, W 1 c! (x; p) = ?, which, in turn, implies p = 2 Wc (x; u), as sought. Therefore, Wc (x; u) = Wc (x; u) holds for any u 2 U N and any allocation x such that x 2 W c (u). It follows that for any u 2 U N , any x 2 W c (u), any p 2 Wc (x; u), and any i 2 N , Wc i (x; p) = \ u 0 2W 1 c (x;p) L (x i ; u 0 i ) = y i 2 R`+ j y i and p y i = p ! i holds. Then, if u 2 U N is such that Wc i (x; p) L (x i ; u i ) for all i 2 N , then it is easy to see that x 2 W c (u ). This implies that W c de…ned on U satis…es condition GM .
The above lemma, combined with Theorem 2, readily yields the following corollary.
Corollary 5. Let n 3 and suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, the constrained Walrasian correspondence, W c , de…ned on U N = U , is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity 2 mechanism. The next result is another possibility result, because it shows that the Walrasian correspondence, W , is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity 2 mechanism in two-commodity economies. This stands in stark contrast with the standard literature on implementation, where it is well-known that this SCC is not implementable. 20 Lemma 2. Let n 3 and`= 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, the Walrasian correspondence, W , de…ned on U N = U , satis…es condition GM .
Proof. Suppose that n 3 and`= 2. Moreover, assume that W is de…ned on U N = U , and take any u 2 U N and any x 2 W (u). Then, let us …rst show that W (x; u) is non-empty and consists solely of the Walrasian competitive equilibrium price vectors. Let p W 2 (x; u) be a Walrasian price vector. Note that since x 2 W (u), there is such a price vector. Then, by de…nition, p W x i = p W ! i for any i 2 N . Since U N = U , there always exists u 0 2 U N such that p W = (x; u 0 ). Then, by the de…nition of W , x 2 W (u 0 ), which, in turn, implies that W 1 ! x; p W 6 = ?. Thus, p W 2 W (x; u). Next, let p 2 (x; u) be not a Walrasian price vector. Then, by de…nition, p x i 6 = p ! i for some i 2 N . Since U N = U , there always exists u 0 2 U N such that fpg = (x; u 0 ). This implies that x 2 P (u 0 ), and p is the unique supporting price for u 0 at x. Then, since p x i 6 = p ! i holds for some i 2 N , x = 2 W (u 0 ). The same argument is applied for any other u 00 2 U N such that fpg = (x; u 00 ). Thus, W 1 ! (x; p) = ?, which, in turn, implies p = 2 W (x; u). In summary, W (x; u) is nonempty and consists solely of the Walrasian price vectors. Given this, W (x; u) = W (x; u) holds for any u 2 U N and any allocation x such that x 2 W (u). Then, for any u 2 U N , any x 2 W (u), and any p 2 W (x; u), we have that W i (x; p) = \ u 0 2W 1 (x;p) L (x i ; u 0 i ) = y i 2 R`+ j y i and p y i = p ! i for any i 2 N . Finally, suppose that u 2 U N is such that W i (x; p) L (x i ; u i ) for all i 2 N , but x = 2 W (u ). Then, for any p 2 such that p x i = p ! i for all i 2 N , there exists j 2 N such that x j = 2 arg max p y j =p ! j u j (y j ).
x is not an interior allocation, and x 0 j if x 0 j 2 arg max p y j =p ! j u j (y j ). Thus, for such a price vector p, there is no associated Walrasian allocation under u . Hence, when`= 2, for any x 2 W (u ), the associated Walrasian price vector p implies that, for each i 2 N , p x i 6 = p ! i . This, in turn, implies that, for any x 2 W (u ), x i 6 = x i for each i 2 N . It follows that x h 6 = x h for any H 2 H and any h 2 H. We conclude that W , de…ned on U , satis…es condition GM .
Because condition GM implies condition d
GM , the following corollary is easily obtained from Lemma 2 and Theorem 2. Corollary 6. Let n 3 and`= 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, the Walrasian correspondence, W , de…ned on U N = U , is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity 2 mechanism.
Note that, even under the supposition that an economy is endowed with only two commodities, the Walrasian correspondence is not partially honest implementable by any s-mechanism (see, Lombardi and Yoshihara, 2011a) . In the light of this negative result, Corollary 6 seems remarkably surprising.
In the remaining part of this section, we discuss brie ‡y some implications of Theorem 3; consequently, our discussion will focus on the condition GM and the condition GP Q . Firstly, note that the individual rational and e¢ cient correspondence, IrP , is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity mechanism, since it satis…es the conditions GM and GP Q . Secondly, in two-commodity economies, the Walrasian correspondence, W , is still partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity mechanism when Lemma 2 is read in combination with the following lemma. Proof. Suppose that n 3. Moreover, let W be de…ned on U N = U . We show that W satis…es condition GP Q . Take any (p; x) 2 Q n such that I W (p; x) = N and x = 2 A. Then, W 1 ! P j6 =i x j ; x i ; p 6 = ? for each i 2 N , which implies that for any
holds for any p 0 2 and any i 2 N , which, in turn, implies that z (p; x) 2 W (u ). Therefore, W satis…es condition GP Q (ii). This completes the proof.
Thirdly, we …nd that the constrained Walrasian correspondence is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity mechanism, as the following result shows. Proof. Let n 3. Since W c W , Lemma 3 implies that W c satis…es condition GP Q .
From the above lemmata, the following corollary is readily obtained. Corollary 7. Let n 3 and suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then: (i) The Walrasian correspondence, W , de…ned on U N = U , is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity mechanism when`= 2;
(ii) The constrained Walrasian correspondence, W c , de…ned on U N = U , is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity mechanism.
Finally, we show that the condition GM and the condition GP Q impose non-trivial restrictions on the class of partially honest implementable SCC s by natural price-quantity mechanisms.
Lemma 5. Let n 3 and suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, the Pareto correspondence, P , de…ned on U N = U , does not satisfy condition GP Q (i).
Proof. This is due to the fact that the Pareto correspondence does not satisfy condition P Q(i), as shown in Saijo et al. (1996a) . Figure 1 below. Suppose that there are only three participants and two commodities. Assume that each participant i announces (p; x i ), with x i = 0; 2 2 . Thus, I N P (p; x) = f1; 2; 3g and, for each agent i,
x j x k = ( 1 ; 0), with i 6 = j; k, and N P i ((( 1 ; 0) ; x i ) ; p) is represented by the area of the Figure 0AB is represented by the lines HF and F G. Note that each Pareto e¢ cient allocation x 0 2 P (u ) has the property that the bundle x 0 1 is always on the ray from the origin which passes through the point D. Then, z (p; x) = 2 N P (u ) holds, as shown in Saijo et al. (1999;  Proof of Lemma 1). Because H = 2 N n?, let us consider the case that H = f2g. Since the premises of condition GP Q (iii) are ful…lled, this condition implies that (x 2 ;x 2 ) = 2 N P (u ) for allx 2 2 R 2 2 . However, it can be easily checked that (x 1 ; x 2 ;x 3 ) 2 N P (u ), wherex 1 =x 3 = 1 2 ; 2 4 , yielding a contradiction. We conclude that N P does not satisfy condition GP Q (iii), as sought. Proof. It directly follows from Corollary 4, since condition GM implies condition d GM .
From the above lemmata, the last result of this section follows.
Corollary 8. Let n 3 and suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, neither the Pareto correspondence, P , the no-envy and e¢ cient correspondence, N P , nor the e¢ cient and egalitarian-equivalent correspondence, EE, each of which is de…ned on U N = U , is partially honest implementable by any natural price-quantity mechanism.
All the results of this section are summarized in Table 1 displayed in Section 8.
The case of two agents
In this section, we investigate the two-agent case. Before turning to the details of our investigation, let us clarify some features on which our analysis is based. Firstly, in the two-person case, a natural price-quantity mechanism can be regarded as equivalent to a natural price-allocation mechanism, given that the di¤erence of the aggregate endowment and the quantity announced by an agent can be interpreted as the consumption bundle of the other agent. Then, in what follows, we focus on natural price-allocation mechanisms, where the message space of each agent i is M i A. Secondly, and consequently, for each participant i, the set of truthful messages is that de…ned in (1) . Finally, it is assumed that F selects only interior allocations, 21 that is, F (u) A \ R n+ + for each u 2 U N . In the conventional framework of natural implementation, when n = 2, Saijo et al. (1996a) show that a punishment condition, combined with a stronger variant of Maskin monotonicity, is necessary and su¢ cient for implementation by a natural price-allocation mechanism. The punishment condition can be stated as follows. In abstract social choice environments, Lombardi and Yoshihara (2011a) show that a punishment condition is indispensable for partially honest implementation in the two-person case. As a consequence, we amend the condition P A2 as follows.
Weak Condition PA2 (P A2). There exists a map z :
A A ! Q 2 such that, for any H 2 H and any (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) 2 A A:
(i) the following requirements are satis…ed:
, and z (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) = 2 F (u), then there exists h 2 H such that: (a) if h = 1, then x 0 = 2 F (u) and for some (p 00 ; x 00 ) 2 A, with x 00 2 F (u), z 1 (p; x; p 00 ; x 00 ) 2 @L (z 1 (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) ; u 1 ), or (b) if h = 2, then x = 2 F (u) and for some (p 00 ; x 00 ) 2 A, with x 00 2 F (u), z 2 (p 00 ; x 00 ; p 0 ; x 0 ) 2 @L (z 2 (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) ; u 2 ).
In the above condition, the requirements (b)-(c) imposed by condition P A2(i) are satis…ed by any SCC because the mapping z can be de…ned as z 1 (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) 0 2 F 1 (x; p) and z 2 (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) 0 2 F 2 (x 0 ; p 0 ). However, checking of the condition P A2(ii) can be a di¢ cult matter because it may require a speci…c type of the mapping z.
In line with earlier results, the next theorem (whose proof is relegated to the Appendix) shows that even in two-agent economies the scope of implementation by natural priceallocation mechanisms is enlarged when some of the agents are partially honest, though limits still remain. Theorem 4. Let n = 2 and` 3. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Let F 2 F be an SCC such that F (u) A \ R n+ + for all u 2 U N . Then, F is partially honest implementable by a natural price-allocation mechanism if and only if it satis…es condition P A2.
While the above theorem fully identi…es the class of SCC s that are partially honest implementable by natural price-allocation mechanisms in two-agent economies endowed with more than two commodities, an analogous theorem can be given for two-agent and twocommodity economies for the sake of completeness. To this end, the de…nition of partially honest implementation by natural price-allocation mechanisms must be slightly modi…ed to apply to these kinds of economies. Before introducing this de…nition, some additional notation is needed. Let p 2 R 2 + j P 2 i=1 p i 1 be the set of price announcements that each participant is allowed to report. Moreover, let ' : ! be a surjection as follows: for any p 2 , ' (p) 2 is such that ' 1 (p) ' 2 (p) = p 1 p 2 . Definition 7. Let #N = 2 and`= 2. An SCC F 2 F is partially honest implementable by a natural price-allocation mechanism if there exists a mechanism which satis…es Definition 3-(i), (iv), (v), and: (ii) for each i 2 N , M i = A; and (iii) for each u 2 U N , each x 2 F (u), and each ' (p) 2 (x; u), if m i = (p; x) for each i 2 N , then m 2 N E ( ; < u ) and g (m) = x.
Based on this de…nition, condition P A2 can be shown to be necessary and su¢ cient for partially honest implementation by natural price-allocation mechanisms for two-agent and two-commodity economies (see Theorem 5 in the Appendix).
Finally, let us brie ‡y discuss some implications of the results reported here. Firstly, because the constrained Walrasian correspondence satis…es condition P A2, which can be shown as in the proof of Lemma 3, this SCC is partially honest implementable by a natural price-allocation mechanism even in two-agent economies. Secondly, as discussed in Saijo et al. (1996a) , while the no-envy and e¢ cient correspondence N P satis…es condition P A2, making it partially honest implementable by a natural price-allocation mechanism in twoagent economies, the Pareto correspondence P does not satisfy the assertion (a) of condition P A2(i). The latter remark implies that the Pareto correspondence is not partially honest implementable by any natural price-allocation mechanism in two-agent economies. Finally, let U = U N be the class of all pro…les of utility functions which are continuous, quasiconcave, and strictly monotonic. The following results show that the e¢ cient and egalitarianequivalent correspondence, EE, de…ned on U = U N , is partially honest implementable by natural price-allocation mechanisms even in two-agent economies.
Lemma 8. Let n = 2. Then, the e¢ cient and egalitarian-equivalent correspondence, EE, de…ned on U N = U , satis…es condition P A2.
Proof. See the Appendix. Corollary 9. Let n = 2 and suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, the e¢ cient and egalitarian-equivalent correspondence, EE, de…ned on U N = U , is partially honest implementable by a natural price-allocation mechanism.
A summary of the results reported above can be found in Table 1 displayed in the next section.
Concluding remarks
This paper examined the problem of fully implementing e¢ cient SCC s in classical exchange economies by natural mechanisms when some of the participants are partially honest. The problem is formalized by considering only a minimal departure from the standard framework of natural implementation. First, it is postulated that the mechanism designer knows that there are partially honest agents involved in the mechanism, but not who these agents are. Second, the paper posited that partially honest agents have only "minimal" intrinsic preferences for honesty. The mechanism designer's implementation problem is to design a mechanism in such a way that, regardless of the current economy and the partially honest agents involved in the mechanism, only the F -optimal outcomes emerge as the equilibrium outcomes of the devised game form.
Several concepts of natural implementation are explored. New necessary and su¢ cient conditions for implementation by natural mechanisms are presented. On the basis of these conditions, while the class of SCC s that are implementable by a price-quantity mechanism is signi…cantly enlarged when there are partially honest agents, the scope of natural implementation is drastically enlarged when larger strategy spaces are considered. Remarkably, when there are more than two participants, any e¢ cient SCC is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity n 1 mechanism, and thus by a natural price-allocation mechanism. Surprisingly, the (unconstrained) Walrasian correspondence is partially honest implementable even via a natural price-quantity mechanism in two-commodity economies. The reported results stand in stark contrast with those of the standard literature on natural implementation theory. These results are summarized in Table 1 . no no no yes P Q, price-quantity mechanism; P Q 2 , price-quantity 2 mechanism; P Q n 1 , price-quantity n 1 ; P A, price-allocation mechanism; IrP , the individual rational and e¢ cient correspondence; N P , the no-envy and e¢ cient correspondence; EE, the egalitarian-equivalent and e¢ cient correspondence; W c , the constrained Walrasian correspondence; W , the Walrasian correspondence; P , the Pareto correspondence.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Let n 3 and Assumption 1 hold. Take any F 2 F. Let (M; g) be a price-quantity n 1 mechanism. A message announced by agent i 2 N is denoted by m i = p i ; x i i ; x i i+1 ; :::; x i i+n 2 2 Q n 1 , where x i i+k denotes agent i + k's consumption bundle announced by agent i, for k 2 f1; :::; n 2g. For each i 2 N , the set of truthful messages is that de…ned in (2) . Fix any triple (m; p; x) 2 M A. The message pro…le m is: where` k is regarded as n ` 2 N if` k = ` for`2 fj; ig.
The outcome function g of is de…ned as follows:
Rule 1: If m is consistent with p and x, where p 2 (x; u) and x 2 F (u) for some u 2 U N , then g (m) = x. Rule 2: If m is m i consistent with p and x, where p 2 (x; u) and x 2 F (u) for some u 2 U N , then g (m) = x. Rule 3: Otherwise, g i (m) = and g j (m) = 0 for all j 6 = i , where i is de…ned as follows. Without loss of generality, let us suppose that 1 1. Let P i2N x i i1 = t. Furthermore, by De…nition 4(ii), it follows that x i i1 2 [0; 1 ] for all i 2 N . Let v be an integer such that v t < v + 1. Therefore, t = v + s where s 2 [0; 1). It follows that there is a unique agent i 2 N such that s 2 i 1 n ; i n . According to the proposed construction, is individually feasible and balanced; moreover, it satis…es forthrightness and the best response property.
We show that F (u) = N A ( ; < u ) holds for any u 2 U N and any H 2 H. Take any u 2 U N and any H 2 H.
First, let us show that F (u) N A ( ; < u ) for this H. Let x 2 F (u), and assume that, for all i 2 N , m i = p i ; x i i ; :::; x i i+n 2 = (p; x i ; :::; x i+n 2 ) 2 T i (u; F ), where p 2 (x; u) and the tuple (x i ; :::; x i+n 2 ) is the n 1 tuple of x. From Rule 1 it follows that g (m) = x. Unilateral deviations from this announcement can only induce Rule 2. Therefore, by Rule 2, we have that, for all i 2 N , g (M i ; m i ) = x. It follows that x 2 N A ( ; < u ) for this H.
Conversely, for the …xed H, let m 2 N E ( ; < u ). Since one cannot have a Nash equilibrium message pro…le under Rules 2-3, it follows that m falls into Rule 1. Then, g (m) = x 2 F (u 0 ) for some u 0 2 U N . Suppose that there is a partially honest agent h 2 N such that m h = 2 T h (u; F ). Then, she can induce Rule 2 by changing m h to
h ; m h ) ; m) 2 u h , which contradicts that m 2 N E ( ; < u ) for the given H. Therefore, every partially honest agent h is reporting truthfully. From the uniqueness of x h+n 1 , it follows that x 2 F (u), as sought.
As the above arguments hold for any H 2 H and any u 2 U N , the statement follows.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let n 3 and Assumption 1 hold. Take any F 2 F. Denote an arbitrary partially honest agent by h 2 N . For each i 2 N , the set of truthful messages is that de…ned in (3) .
Suppose that F is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity 2 mechanism . We show that F satis…es condition d GM . Let (H; u; x; p) 2 H U N F (u) F (x; u) be given. For each i 2 N , let m i = (p; x i ; x i+1 ) 2 Q 2 , where n + 1 = 1. Then, for all u 0 2 F 1 (x; p), g (m) = x and m 2 N E ; < u 0 by forthrightness. Observe that m 2 N E ; < u 0 for all H 0 2 H and all u 0 2 F 1 (x; p). This implies that g i (M i ; m i ) L (x i ; u 0 i ) for all u 0 2 F 1 (x; p). Then, g i (M i ; m i ) F i (x; p) for all i 2 N . Let x = 2 F (u ) for some u 2 U N and F i (x; p) L (x i ; u i ) for all i 2 N . Therefore, g (m) = x = 2 N A ; < u for all H 0 2 H. We have that ((m 0 i ; m i ) ; m) 2 u i for some i 2 N and some m 0
). Thus, the deviator i is a partially honest agent, that is, i 2 H. Therefore, m i = 2 T i (u ; F ) and m 0 i 2 T i (u ; F ), otherwise we fall into a contradiction. Then, x i ; x i+1 ; x 0 fi;i+1g = 2 F (u ) for all x 0 fi;i+1g 2 R (n 2)`. Moreover, p; x i ; x i+1 2 T i (u ; F ) and x i ; x i+1 6 = (x i ; x i+1 ) hold for each x 2 F (u ), since otherwise, a contradiction is obtained. We conclude that, for some i 2 H, x i 6 = x i or x i+1 6 = x i+1 for all x 2 F (u ), as sought. Since it holds for any H 2 H, we conclude that F satis…es condition d GM . Next, we prove su¢ ciency. Suppose that F satis…es condition d GM . Consider the following price-quantity 2 mechanism (M; g). For each i 2 N , let M i Q 2 . A message announced by agent i 2 N is denoted by 
where 1 1 = n and n + 1 = 1.
The outcome function g of is de…ned as follows: x i i ;
Rule 3: Otherwise, g i (m) = and g j (m) = 0 for all j 6 = i , where i is de…ned as follows. Without loss of generality, let us suppose that 1 ) . It follows that there is a unique agent i 2 N such that s 2 i 1 n ; i n . According to the proposed construction, is individually feasible and balanced; moreover, it satis…es forthrightness and the best response property.
First, we show F (u) N A ( ; < u ). Let x 2 F (u) and p 2 F (x; u). Let m i = (p; x i ; x i+1 ) 2 T i (u; F ) for each i 2 N . Then, by Rule 1, g (m) = x. Suppose that agent i 2 N deviates from m i to a di¤erent message m 0 i 2 M i . By the de…nition of g, we have that any deviation of agent i will get her to an outcome in F i (x; p), so that g i (M i ; m i ) = Thus, for the given H, condition d GM implies that x 2 F (u). As the above arguments hold for any H 2 H and any u 2 U N , the statement follows.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let n 3 and suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Take any F 2 F. For each i 2 N , the set of truthful messages is that de…ned in (4) .
Let us …rst show the necessity of condition GM and condition GP Q . To that purpose, suppose that F is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity mechanism.
First, we show that F meets condition GM . Let (H; u; x; p) 2 H U N F (u) F (x; u) be given. For each i 2 N , let m i (p; x i ) 2 Q. Then, for any u 0 2 F 1 (x; p), g (m) = x and m 2 N E ; < u 0 hold by forthrightness. Thus, g i (M i ; m i ) L (x i ; u 0 i ). Since it holds for any u 0 2 F 1 (x; p), it follows that g i (M i ; m i ) 
. Thus, agent i is a partially honest agent, that is, i 2 H. It follows that m i = 2 T i (u ; F ) and m 0 i (p; x i ) 2 T i (u ; F ), with x i 6 = x i , otherwise we fall into a contradiction. We conclude that x h 6 = x h for all x 2 F (u ) for some h(= i) 2 H, as sought. Since it holds for any H 2 H, we conclude that F satis…es condition GM .
Next, we show that F satis…es condition GP Q . Take any H 2 H. Let (p; x) 2 Q n be such that I F (p; x) = N and x = 2 A. Take any i 2 N and any u 2 F 1 P l6 =i x l ; x i ; p . De…ne m l (p; x l ) for all l 2 N n fig and m i p; P l6 =i x l . Forthrightness implies that g (m) = P l6 =i x l ; x i and m 2 N E ( ; < u ) for the given H. Because m j 2 T j (u; F ) for all j 2 N , we have that m 2 N E ( ; < u ) for each H 0 2 H. Moreover, we have that g i (M i ; m i ) L P l6 =i x l ; u i . Since the previous arguments hold for any u 2 F 1 P l6 =i x l ; x i ; p and any i 2 N , it follows that
Then, z i (p; x) 2 F i P l6 =i x l ; x i ; p for all i 2 N . This proves condition GP Q (i). For each i 2 N , let us de…ne the map S i ( ; (p; x i )) :
Q ! Q as follows. For any
To show that condition GP Q (iii) is also satis…ed, take any u 2 U N and suppose that
g ( m) = 2 F (u ) = N A ( ; <) for all H 0 2 H. Then, ((m 0 i ; m i ) ; m) 2 u i for some i 2 N and some m 0
). Then, the deviator i is a partially honest agent, that is, i 2 H. Therefore, m 0 i (p 0 ; x 0 i ) 2 T i (u ; F ) and m i = 2 T i (u ; F ), otherwise we fall into a contradiction. Let h i. Since m h = 2 T h (u ; F ), it follows that (x h ;x h ) = 2 F (u ) for allx h 2 R (n 1)`. Thus, the assertion (a) of condition GP Q (iii) holds. Hence, we are left to show that the assertion (b) of this condition is veri…ed by F too. From the previous arguments, it follows that g h (m 0
Thus, by the de…nition of the mapping S h ( ; (p; x h )) in condition GP Q (ii), we have that S h ((p 0 ; x 0 h ) ; (p; x h )) g h ((p 0 ; x 0 h ) ; m h ). Hence, S h ((p 0 ; x 0 h ) ; (p; x h )) 2 @L (z h (p; x) ; u h ), as sought. In summary, condition GP Q (iii) is satis…ed.
Next, we prove su¢ ciency. Suppose that F satis…es condition GM and condition GP Q . Because of condition GP Q (ii), for each i 2 N , there exists a map S i ( ; (p; x i )) : Q ! Q which satis…es the requirements of condition GP Q (ii). For any vertex p 2 and any other price vector p 2 , let B ( p; p) be a closed ball with center p and radius > 0 such that B ( p; p) and p = 2 B ( p; p). Since B ( p; p) and are homeomorphic, there is a bijection between : B ( p; p) ! . Then, given (p; x i ) 2 Q n 1 and a vertex p 2 , let us de…ne, for each i 2 N , the mapS i ( ; (p;
i (x; p) and @z i 2 F i (x; p) such that z i y i . Consider the following price-quantity mechanism (M; g). For each i 2 N , let M i Q. A message announced by agent i 2 N is denoted by m i = (p i ; x i i ) 2 Q. De…ne its outcome function as follows: 
l6 =i x l ; x i ; p \ fy i 2 R`+j there exists 2 R + such that y i = x i g; Rule 5: Otherwise, g i (m) = and g j (m) = 0 for all j 6 = i , where i is de…ned as follows. Without loss of generality, let us suppose that 1 1. Let P i2N y i i1 = t. Furthermore, by De…nition 6(ii), it follows that, for all i 2 N , y i1 2 [0; 1 ]. Let v be an integer such that v t < v + 1. Therefore, t = v + s where s 2 [0; 1). It follows that there is a unique agent i 2 N such that s 2 i 1 n ; i n . According to the proposed construction, is individually feasible and balanced; moreover, it satis…es forthrightness and the best response property.
We show that F (u) = N A ( ; < u ) holds for any u 2 U N and any H 2 H. To this end, take any u 2 U N and any H 2 H.
First, we show F (u) N A ( ; < u ) for this H. Let x 2 F (u) and p 2 F (x; u). Let m i = (p; x i ) 2 T i (u; F ) for all i 2 N . Rule 1 implies g (m) = x. Suppose that agent i deviates from m i to a di¤erent message m 0 i 2 M i . By the de…nition of g, any deviation of agent i 2 N will get her to an outcome in F i (x; p) so that g i (M i ; m i ) F i (x; p). Since for the given H, as sought.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let n = 2 and` 3. Let Assumption 1 hold. Let F 2 F be such that F (u) A \ R n+ + for all u 2 U N . For each i 2 N , the set of truthful messages is that de…ned in (1) . First, we show that F satis…es condition P A2. Suppose that F is partially honest implementable by a natural price-allocation mechanism.
Take any H 2 H. Let us de…ne the map z : M ! Q 2 as follows: (a) if F 1 (x; p) 6 = ? and F 1 (x 0 ; p 0 ) 6 = ?, then z (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) = g ((p 0 ; x 0 ) ; (p; x)); (b) if F 1 (x; p) 6 = ? and F 1 (x 0 ; p 0 ) = ?, with x 0 2 F (u) for some u 2 U N , then z (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) = g ((p 0 ; x 0 ) ; (p; x)); (c) if F 1 (x; p) = ?, F 1 (x 0 ; p 0 ) 6 = ?, with x 2 F (u) for some u 2 U N , then z (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) = g ((p 0 ; x 0 ) ; (p; x)); (d) otherwise, z (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) = 0.
Pick any (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) 2 A A, with F 1 (x; p) 6 = ? and F 1 (x 0 ; p 0 ) 6 = ?. Take any u 2 F 1 (x; p) and let m i = (p i ; x i ) = (p; x) for each i 2 N . From forthrightness, it follows that m 2 N E ( ; < u ) and g (m) = x. So, g 1 (M 1 ; (p; x)) L (x 1 ; u 1 ). Since this property holds for any u 2 F 1 (x; p), we have that g 1 (M 1 ; (p; x)) F 1 (x; p). Similarly, it can be shown that g 2 ((p 0 ; x 0 ) ; M 2 )
. From the de…nition of the map z, it follows that z (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) = g ((p 0 ; x 0 ) ; (p; x)). Then, z (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) 2 A, with z 1 (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) 2 F 1 (x; p) and z 2 (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) 2 F 2 (x 0 ; p 0 ). Moreover, from the above arguments, z (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) = g ((p 0 ; x 0 ) ; (p; x)) = x if (p; x) = (p 0 ; x 0 ). This proves the assertion (a) of condition P A2(i).
Pick any (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) 2 A A such that F 1 (x; p) 6 = ?, F 1 (x 0 ; p 0 ) = ? and x 0 2 F (u) for some u 2 U N . Then, from the de…nition of the map z, it follows z (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) 2 A and z 1 (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) 2 F 1 (x; p). This proves the assertion (b) of condition P A2(i). Similarly, it can be shown that the map z satis…es the assertion (c) of condition P A2(i). Finally, the assertion (d) of condition P A2 is obvious by the de…nition of the mapping z. We conclude that condition P A2(i) is veri…ed.
Finally, we show that condition P A2(ii) is satis…ed by the given F and H 2 H. Take any u 2 U N and any (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) 2 A A, with (p; x) 6 = (p 0 ; x 0 ). Suppose that the premises of condition P A2(ii) are satis…ed. Therefore, z (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) = g ((p 0 ; x 0 ) ; (p; x)) = 2 F (u) = N A ( ; < u ) for each H 0 2 H, and m ((p 0 ; x 0 ) ; (p; x)) = 2 N E ( ; < u ) for each H 0 2 H. It follows that ((m i ; m l ) ; m) 2 u i for some i 2 N and somem i 2 M i , with i 6 = l 2 N . This implies that u i (g i (m i ; m l )) u i (g i ( m)). However, since g i (m i ; m l ) 2 g i (M i ; m l ) L(z i (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) ; u i ), it follows that u i (g i (m i ; m l )) = u i (g i ( m)). Therefore, the deviator i is a partially honest agent, that is, i 2 H. This means thatm i (p;x) 2 T i (u; F ) and m i = 2 T i (u; F ), otherwise we fall into a contradiction. Suppose that the deviator is i 1. Then, since m 1 = 2 T 1 (u; F ), x 0 = 2 F (u) holds. Moreover, since u 1 (g 1 (m 1 ; m 2 )) = u 1 (g 1 ( m)), g 1 (m 1 ; m 2 ) 2 @L (z 1 (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) ; u 1 ) holds. Suppose that F 1 (p;x) 6 = ?. Then, F 1 (p;x) 6 = ? and F 1 (p; x) 6 = ?. It follows from the de…nition of the mapping z that g 1 (m 1 ; m 2 ) = z 1 (p; x;p;x). Otherwise, suppose that F 1 (p;x) = ?. Then, F 1 (p; x) 6 = ? and F 1 (p;x) = ?, withx 2 F (u). Again, by the de…nition of the mapping z, g 1 (m 1 ; m 2 ) = z 1 (p; x;p;x). In any case, we have found that x 0 = 2 F (u) and z 1 (p; x;p;x) = g 1 (m 1 ; m 2 ) 2 @L (z 1 (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) ; u 1 ), withx 2 F (u). Similar arguments can be applied to the case that the deviator is i 2. We conclude that F satis…es condition P A2(ii), as sought.
Next, we prove su¢ ciency. Suppose that F satis…es condition P A2. We show that F is partially honestly implemented by a natural price-allocation mechanism. Then, let the message space of each agent i 2 N be M i A. Then, the message of the participant i, denoted m i = (p i ; x i ), consists of a price vector and a feasible allocation. Let = (M; g) be a price-allocation mechanism.
Because F satis…es condition P A2, there exists a map z : M ! Q 2 satisfying the requirements of condition P A2(i). For any two di¤erent vertices p and = p of the unit simplex , ( p; = p) denotes the 1-dimensional simplex with vertices p and = p. Next, …x any two vertices of the simplex , that is, p and is the allocation speci…ed speci…ed by the assertions (c) and (d) of condition P A2(i). Finally, for any x 2 R n+ and p 2 , B F i (x; p) is the upper boundary of F i (x; p), that is, B F i (x; p) fy i 2 R`+jy i 2 F i (x; p) and @z i 2 F i (x; p) such that z i y i g. De…ne the outcome function g of as follows:
Rule 1: If (p 1 ; x 1 ) = (p 2 ; x 2 ) = (p; x) and F 1 (x; p) 6 = ?, then g (m) = x.
Rule 2: If (p 1 ; x 1 ) 6 = (p 2 ; x 2 ) and F 1 (x i ; p i ) 6 = ? for all i 2 N , then g (m) = z (p 2 ; x 2 ; p 1 ; x 1 ), where z (p 2 ; x 2 ; p 1 ; x 1 ) is the allocation speci…ed by the assertion (a) of condition P A2(i).
Rule 3: If (p 1 ; x 1 ) 6 = (p 2 ; x 2 ), F 1 x l ; p l 6 = ? for some l 2 N and F 1 (x i ; p i ) = ? for i 2 N n flg, then: where fx i g B F i x l ; p l \ fy i 2 R`+j there exists 2 R + such that y i = x i g, where l 2 N n fig; Rule 4: Otherwise, g i (m) = and g j (m) = 0 for all j 6 = i , where i is de…ned as follows. Without loss of generality, let us suppose that 1 1. Let P i2N x i i1 = t. Furthermore, by De…nition 3(ii), it follows that x i i1 2 [0; 1 ] for all i 2 N . Let v be an integer such that v t < v + 1. Therefore, let t = v + s where s 2 [0; 1). It follows that there is a unique i 2 N such that s 2 i 1 n ; i n . According to the proposed construction, is individually feasible and balanced; moreover, it satis…es forthrightness and the best response property.
We show that F (u) = N A ( ; < u ) for any u 2 U N and any H 2 H. Then, take any u 2 U N and any H 2 H.
First, we show that F (u) N A ( ; < u ). To this end, let x 2 F (u) and p 2 (x; u). Let m i = (p i ; x i ) = (p; x) 2 T i (u; F ) for each i 2 N . From Rule 1, it follows that g (m) = x. Suppose that agent i 2 N deviates from m i to a di¤erent message m 0 i 2 M i . By the de…nition of g, we have that any deviation of agent i will get her to an outcome in F i (x; p), so that g i (M i ; m l ) ; m) 2 u h , which contradicts that m 2 N E ( ; < u ) for the given H. Therefore, m h 2 T h (u; F ) for all h 2 H. We conclude that x 2 F (u) for this H, as sought.
Suppose that m falls into Rule 2. Then, g (m) = g ((p 1 ; x 1 ) ; (p 2 ; x 2 )) = z (p 2 ; x 2 ; p 1 ; x 1 ). Notice that each agent i 2 N can induce Rule 3.2 and attain any bundle in @ F i x l ; p l , where l 2 N n fig. Thus, @ F i x l ; p l g i (M i ; m l ). Because m 2 N E ( ; < u ), it follows that @ F i x l ; p l L (z i (p 2 ; x 2 ; p 1 ; x 1 ) ; u i ). Therefore, F i x l ; p l L (z i (p 2 ; x 2 ; p 1 ; x 1 ) ; u i ) for each i 2 N , given our supposition of agents' preferences. By the supposition that m 2 N E ( ; < u ), it follows that for any h 2 H, g h (m h ; m h ) = 2 @L (z h (p 2 ; x 2 ; p 1 ; x 1 ) ; u h ) if m h = 2 T h (u; F ) and m h 2 T h (u; F ), otherwise we fall into a contradiction. Suppose that m h 2 T h (u; F ) for each h 2 H. Then, condition P A2(ii) implies that z (p 2 ; x 2 ; p 1 ; x 1 ) 2 F (u) for the given H. Otherwise, let us suppose that m h = 2 T h (u; F ) for some h 2 H. De…ne H 0 fh 2 Hjm h = 2 T h (u; F )g. Therefore, x h = 2 F (u) for all h 2 H 0 . Next, take any Then, g h ((p ; x ) ; (p 2 ; x 2 )) =z h (p ; x ; p 2 ; x 2 ) 6 = 0 holds. Note thatz h ((p ; x ) ; (p 2 ; x 2 )) 6 = 0 because x 2 F (u). Thus,z h (p ; x ; p 2 ; x 2 ) = 2 @L (z h (p 2 ; x 2 ; p 1 ; x 1 ) ; u h ). By de…nition ofz ( ; p 2 ; x 2 ), z h (p 2 ; x 2 ; (p ) ; x ) = 2 @L (z h (p 2 ; x 2 ; p 1 ; x 1 ) ; u h ). Since is a bijection and the previous arguments hold for any p 2 B p; = p and any x 2 F (u), z h (p 2 ; x 2 ; p; x) = 2 @L (z h (p 2 ; x 2 ; p 1 ; x 1 ) ; u h ) for any p 2 and any x 2 F (u). Similar reasoning applies if h 2. Moreover, if HnH 0 is not an empty set, then m h 2 T h (u; F ) for h 2 HnH 0 . Condition P A2(ii) implies that z (p 2 ; x 2 ; p 1 ; x 1 ) 2 F (u) for the given H, as sought.
Theorem 5. Let n = 2 and`= 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Let F 2 F be such that F (u) A \ R n+ + for all u 2 U N . Then, F is partially honest implementable by a natural price-allocation mechanism in terms of Definition 7 if and only if it satis…es condition P A2. Now, let us …rst show that EE satis…es condition P A2(i). To this end, it su¢ ces to consider the following cases: (1) p x 1 > p 1 z 1 (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) 2 EE 1 (x; p) = H (p; x 1 ) \ Q and z 2 (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) 2 EE 2 (x 0 ; p 0 ) = H (p 0 ; x 0 2 ) \ Q. Moreover, suppose that, for some u 2 U N , we have that EE 1 (x; p) L (z 1 (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) ; u 1 ) and EE 2 (x 0 ; p 0 ) L (z 2 (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) ; u 2 ). Then, z (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) 2 P (u ). Furthermore, because z (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) 1 2 ; 1 2 , it follows that z (p; x; p 0 ; x 0 ) 2 EE (u ), as sought. We conclude that condition P A2(ii) is satis…ed by EE. This completes the proof.
